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Weeks v. Angelone
176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999)
L Facts
On the evening of February 23, 1993, Lonnie Weeks, Jr. ("Weeks"),
was riding as a passenger in a stolen car driven by his uncle, Lewis J. Dukes,
Jr. ("Dukes"). The two men were traveling from Washington, D.C., to
Richmond on Interstate 95 when State TrooperJose Cavazos stopped them
for a speeding violation. After complying with the trooper's request to step
out of the car, Weeks fired at the trooper with a nine millimeter semiauto-
matic pistol. Two of the bullets hit the trooper, and he died minutes later.
The two men left the scene, with Weeks driving, and parked the car at a
nearby service station. Weeks returned to the scene on foot to retrieve
Dukes's driver's license, which had fallen on the pavement. Shortly after
Weeks rejoined Dukes, police found the two men in the parking lot of a
nearby motel.'
Around 3:00 a.m., state police Special AgentJ.K. Rowland ("Rowland")
interviewed Weeks in one of the rooms at the motel. At 7:40 a.m., Rowland
advised Weeks of his constitutional rights under Miranda v Arizona.' At
7:50 a.m., another investigator notified Rowland that Dukes told police that
Weeks shot the trooper. At 7:52 a.m., Rowland arrested Weeks. Weeks
appeared before a magistrate and was subsequently placed in a detention
center. During an interview at the jail, in which officers questioned him
about his physical and mental state, Weeks indicated that he was contem-
plating suicide because he shot the trooper. Weeks also admitted shooting
the trooper and expressed remorse in a letter he wrote to a jail officer.3
Around 6:00 p.m. on February 24, Weeks was taken to the local
prosecutor's office where Rowland conducted a second interview. Rowland
asked Weeks if he remembered the rights which Rowland read to him
earlier that morning. After Weeks responded affirmatively, Rowland
summarized the information the police had accumulated against him.
Rowland asked Weeks if he wanted to give the police his own explanation;
Weeks then confessed to shooting the trooper.
1. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 382-83 (Va. 1994).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 384-85.
4. Id. at 385.
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Weeks was found guilty of capital murder in October 1993. The jury
recommended the death sentence after finding the vileness aggravating
factor. The trial judge adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Weeks to death. Weeks's subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the United States Supreme Court were denied. After exhaust-
ing state habeas proceedings, Weeks petitioned the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for habeas corpus relief; the
district court dismissed the petition. Weeks then filed an application for a
certificate of appealability with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit i
Ii. Holding
The Fourth Circuit made the following rulings: (1) jury instructions
at sentencing did not prevent the jury from considering relevant mitigating
evidence;6 (2) because appointment of pathology and ballistics experts would
have required application of a new rule in violation Teague v. Lane,/appoint-
ment was not constitutionally required;' (3) because the admission of
Weeks's confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Michigan v. Mosley,9 it was reasonable for the Supreme Court of Virginia to
uphold its admission; 0 (4) claims which the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to consider due to noncompliance with procedural rules were
procedurally defaulted; (5) claims that Weeks failed to brief before the
Supreme Court of Virginia were procedurally defaulted; and (6) the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted. 1
5. Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Weeks, 450 S.E.2d
379; Weeks v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 829 (1995)).
6. Id. at 261.
7. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that habeas corpus cannot be used
to create new rules of constitutional criminal procedure unless the rules would apply
retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions to the
rule precluding their applicability to cases that are final).
8. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 266.
9. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
10. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 269.
11. Id. at 270-74. The court's disposition of several of Weeks's claims will not be
discussed in detail in this article because they add nothing of substance to capital defense law
in Virginia. These claims include Weeks's challenges to the district court's finding that three
of his claims had been procedurally defaulted. Id. at 270. These claims are briefly described
below.
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to hear certain claims because Weeks failed to
register objections at trial as required by Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25. When Weeks raised the objections in his federal habeas
petition, the district court determined that the claims had been procedurally defaulted.
Weeks did not contest that these claims were procedurally defaulted. Instead, he argued that
Rule 5:25 was not an adequate state procedural bar because the Virginia courts did not apply
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Ii. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Jury Instructions at Sentencing
During the sentencing phase of Weeks's trial, the trial judge gave the
jury a lengthy instruction regarding sentencing.12 Weeks's counsel wanted
it consistently. The Fourth Circuit found this argument to be without merit. Weeks, 176
F.3d at 270. Defense counsel should be aware of this rule and ensure that all objections are
made in a timely manner.
Weeks originally filed a ninety-page brief in which he raised forty-seven errors, but the
Supreme Court of Virginia denied his motion for leave to file a brief exceeding the fifty-page
limit. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26. Because of the rigid space limitation, Weeks was forced to
delete ten claims of federal constitutional error. Weeks argued that his federal constitutional
claims were not procedurally barred because (1) the fifty-page limitation prevented him from
including the claims within his brief, (2) even if there was an adequate state procedural bar,
sufficient cause and prejudice existed to overcome the bar, and (3) by including the claims in
his original ninety-page brief, he had sufficiently presented the claims for review. The Fourth
Circuit found none of these claims persuasive. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 271-72. The fity-page brief
limit is an established rule of the court and may only be extended by leave to file a longer
brief. If the court refuses to grant the motion to extend the brief, counsel must include all
of the claims it wishes to pursue within the established page limitation of the brief. And to
avoid procedural default of claims that are squeezed into the fifty-page limitation, all claims
must "be presented faceup and squarely." Townes v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted ).Weeks also challenged the district court's determination that his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims were procedurally defaulted. Weeks argued that, even if his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims were defaulted, the default was overcome by cause and prejudice
Because there is no constitutional right to counsel on state habeas, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim on which Weeks relied was
insufficient to overcome his defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Weeks, 176
F.3d at 273-74.
12. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 258 & n.3. The instruction given to the jury read as follows:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be punished by death.
You must decide whether the defendant shall be sentenced to aeath or to impris-
onment for life or to imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but
not more than $100 000. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Common-
wealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following two
alternatives:
1. That, after consideration of his history and background there is a probability
that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a contimu-
ing serious threat to society; or
2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind or a ravated
battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish itfie act of
murder.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, and as to that alternative you are
unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death or if you
believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall
fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for
live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one
1999]
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to use an instruction which explained to the jury that even if it found that
the Commonwealth provedone or both of the aggravating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt, it had the option of giving effect to the mitigating
evidence and sentencing Weeks to life in prison.'3 During deliberations, the
jury sent a question to the trial judge asking if it was required to issue the
death penalty if it found one of the aggravating factors, or if it could choose
whether or not to issue the death sentence even after finding that one of the
factors had been established. 4 Instead of clarifying the instruction, the trial
judge simply instructed the jury to reread a portion of the instruction which
read as follows:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, and as to that
alternative you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the
defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defen-
dant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] and a fine of a
specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00."
After deliberating for several more hours, the jury returned with a
recommendation of death.1
6
Weeks argued that the effect of the jury instruction was to preclude the
jury from considering mitigating evidence. 17  More specifically, Weeks
argued that the jury instruction violated Boyde v. California." Boyde held
that where a jury instruction is ambiguous, the proper inquiry is "whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally
relevant evidence."' In Buchanan v. Angelone,2" the United States Supreme
Court upheld the sentencing instruction at issue in this case against Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.2' The court determined that the
holding in Buchanan reduced Weeks's claim to an argument that the trial
judge's refusal to clarify the instruction for the jury violated the Eighth and
of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at life
imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but
not more than $100,000.00.
Id.
13. Id. at 258-59.
14. Id. at 259.
i5. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 258.
18. 494 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1990) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires that the
jury be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence offered during the sentencing
phase in a capital case).
19. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
20. 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
21. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-77 (1998).
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Fourteenth Amendments." To succeed on this argument, Weeks needed
to show that the jury's question itself indicated that it was reasonably likely
that the jury would apply the instruction in a way that precluded the
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence." The court ultimately
determined that no reasonable juror would find that the instruction pre-
cluded consideration of mitigating evidence.24
Although Weeks's challenges to the jury instructions were dismissed by
the Fourth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari on this issue.2"
B. Pathology and Ballistics Experts
Before trial, Weeks filed a motion to obtain pathology and ballistics
experts to assist him in his defense on the issues of premeditation in the guilt
phase and the vileness aggravator in the sentencing phase.26 Weeks argued
that the trial court's refusal to grant his request for appointed experts
violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Fourth Circuit
applied the Teague v. Lane standard to determine whether Weeks's claim for
expert assistance was erroneously denied by the trial court.28 Teague held
that new rules will not apply to or be announced in cases coming before a
court on collateral review unless they are (1) new rules placing certain
individual conduct outside the power of the criminal law or (2) "watershed
rules of criminal procedure" that facilitate the fact-finding process and
implicate fundamental fairness.2' To determine if Weeks was seeking the
application of a new rule, the court asked whether, as of the date Weeks's
conviction became final, a Virginia state court would have been compelled
by existing precedent to conclude that the Constitution required the ap-
pointment of experts in pathology and ballistics.i1
The court read Ake v. Oklahoma 1 and Caldwell v. Mississippi 2 together
and concluded that, at the time his conviction became final, Weeks would
only have been entitled to the assistance of psychiatric experts had his sanity
22. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 261.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Josh White, Supreme Court Stays Execution, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1999, at BI.
26. Weeks, 176 F.2d at 261-62.
27. Id. at 261.
28. Id. at 263-64.
29. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.288, 311-12 (1989) (plurality opinion).
30. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 264.
31. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when sanity will be an issue at trial, due process
requires that the State provide indigent defendants with access to a competent psychiatric
expert).
32. 472 U.S. 320, 323 & n.1 (1985) (indicating that due process may require an indigent
defendant to have access to non-psychiatric experts).
1999] 245
246 CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 12:1
been an issue at trial.33 Allowing Weeks to have access to appointed pathol-
ogy and. ballistics experts would have required the court to announce a new
rule in violation of Teague." The court then considered whether the new
rule would fall into one of the two Teague exceptions." Weeks argued that
the rule fell under the exception allowing retroactive application of a
"watershed rule of criminal procedure" that contributes to the fact-finding
process and implicates fundamental fairness.36 The court ultimately deter-
mined that Weeks's request did not fall under either of the two exceptions
and concluded that granting a right to non-psychiatric experts, even if
limited by a showing of particularized need, would require the court to
apply a new rule in violation of Teague.3"
The court dismissed Weeks's reliance on Husske v. Commonwealt 38
because it was decided a year after his conviction had already become final.39
Today, however, Husske provides capital defense counsel with important
authority for requesting appointment of non-psychiatric experts. Under
Husske, a defendant is entitled to have non-psychiatric experts appointed if
he can show that the expert would be a significant element of his defense
and that denial of such assistance would be prejudicial.' While the standard
in Husske may be a high one, counsel should nevertheless continue to
request the appointment of non-psychiatric experts to assist in both the guilt
and sentencing phases of capital trials.
C. Admissibility of Confession After Defendant Invoked
His Right to Remain Silent
Weeks also claims that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation was violated by the introduction of his confession.4 The confession
was made during the second interview with Agent Rowland, hours after
Weeks invoked his right to remain silent.42 The court relied on the factors
set forth in Michigan v. Mosley"3 to determine if the resumption of question-
ing was permissible in the sense that Weeks's right to discontinue question-
33. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 265.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 266.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
39. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 265.
40. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-27 (Va. 1996). For a discussion of
how the appointment of experts may become more vital when the Commonwealth puts on
an expert witness of its own, see Jason J. Solomon, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 315 (1999)
(analyzing Chichester v. Taylor, No. 98-15, 1999 WL 3736 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999)).
41. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 267.
42. Id.
43. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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ing was "scrupulously honored."" Mosley directs the court to consider the
following factors: (1) whether police gave the suspect Miranda warnings
during the first interview or interrogation; (2) whether police immediately
stopped questioning once the suspect exercised his right to remain silent; (3)
whether police resumed questioning only after a significant amount of time
had passed; (4) whether police gave the suspect a second Miranda warning
before resuming questioning; and (5) whether the second interview was
limited to a crime that had not been discussed during the first interview.45
The court concluded that, taken together, the Mosley factors indicated that
police "scrupulously honored" Weeks's Fifth Amendment rights.46
Whether Weeks's Fifth Amendment rights were "scrupulously hon-
ored" is a matter open to debate. The representation of Weeks's Miranda
rights in his second interview with police was only a reminder of the rights
that were read to him the day before. Police found Weeks around 3:00 a.m.
on September 23rd, and he was awake until at least around 8:00 a.m. when
he was finally arrested. 7 Weeks presumably slept at some point before he
was questioned at 6:00 p.m. on September 24th. Given these circumstances,
the likelihood of Weeks's Miranda rights being fresh in his mind is slim.
Thus, the reminder of the rights read to him the day before was arguably
insufficient to convey to Weeks that he still had the right to remain silent.
IV Epilogue
Two hours before Weeks was scheduled to die b i lethal injection, the
United States Supreme Court stayed his execution.' A petition filed by
Weeks's attorneys, arguing that the instructions given to the jury during the
sentencing phase were confusing, prompted the Court to issue the stay' and
grant Weeks's petition for writ of certiorari.5 The Court's recent grant of
certiorari shows that aggressive capital defense does make a difference. The
decision to grant certiorari may have been influenced by sworn affidavits
44. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 267 (citing Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)).
45. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-107.
46. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 269.
47. Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 385.
48. The Court in Mosley emphasized the fact that 'the police gave full 'Miranda
warnings' to [petitioner] at the very outset of each interrogation." Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106
(emphasis added). The second interrogation in Mosley occurred approximately two hours
after the first interrogation, and the petitioner was questioned about an offense unrelated to
the offense discussed during the first interrogation. Id at 104. In contrast, Weeks was only
asked by the police if he remembered the rights that were read to him ten hours earlier, and
both interrogations involved the same offense. Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 385.
49. White, supra note 25, at B1.
50. Id.




from two of the jurors who have indicated that they had wanted to sentence
Weeks to life in prison rather than sentence him to death. 2 Both of the
jurors said that they were confused by the jury instruction."
Heather L. Necklaus
52. White, supra note 25, at B1.
53. Id.
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